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AN APPEAL TO SAVE OUR WRITTEN CONSTITU-
TIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
H. E. NICHOLS
OO OFTEN a crisis is required to alarm us sufficiently to bring us
to our senses. The Supreme Court's decision in the case of
Brown v. Board of Education' produced such a crisis, for no
other decision of this nation's highest tribunal has so forcibly and
glaringly focused attention upon the fact that since 1937 the Supreme
Court has time and again, without authority, sought to amend the
United States Constitution. Prior to 1937 the people of the United
States had been pretty well able to depend upon the judgments of the
Court because its decisions were generally rendered on long estab-
lished constructions of the Constitution and legal precedent. Subse-
quent to 1937, but prior to the integration decision of May, 1954,
supra, the complacent attitude of the populace throughout the entire
country had been that the ends justified the means, the most dangerous
attitude of which one can possibly conceive. Since no one objected to
the ends sought to be accomplished there were no effective objections
directed at the unconstitutional manner in which the desirable ends
were being reached. The objections that were voiced were not strong
enough to stop the iniquitous practice. But in 1954, when the Supreme
Court deliberately ignored and ruled contrary to a decision rendered
in 1927,2 in which it had held that separate but equal school facilities
met constitutional requirements under the 14th Amendment, the
powder was indeed thrown into the fire. As was stated by E. Morton
Coulter, Professor Emeritus, University of Georgia: "It is a fact
which anyone may decide for himself that the 1954 decision of the
Supreme Court called for a greater fundamental social change and an
upset way of life not only as old as the republic but antedating the
republic back to the beginning of the colonization of America. It
called for a more fundamental change than was worked by any of the
last seven amendments to the United States Constitution ... And yet
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
Presiding Judge, Court of Appeals of Georgia. LL.B. Cumberland School of Law
of Howard college.
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the Supreme Court took it upon itself to so amend the Constitution. '
The truly big question brought on by the integration decision,
however, is not the mixing or the association of the races, in schools or
otherwise-the big question is whether the states have the right, un-
der the protection of the Constitution, to govern their own affairs.
This makes the question then just as important to the states of New
England and the Pacific Coast as it does to the states of the South. All
states want to decide for themselves how to conduct their own affairs.
The underlying question, therefore, is What is the Constitution? Is it
whatever the justices of the Supreme Court from time to time say it
is? Or is the Supreme Court without authority to reverse an initial
decision ascertaining intent and extracting a constitutional principle
and thereby in effect to amend the Constitution? It took the 1954
integration decision to awaken America and shock her into a con-
sciousness of what had begun to happen in 1937 and what we have to
do to save our Written Constitution. I very much doubt that the
Court will ever again make such a mistake but it is a matter of plain
and simple justice that the South should not have to raise the issue,
prove the point, save the Constitution and yet have to pay the assess-
ment of having to abide by the unconstitutional decision because of
the failure of the Court to correct its mistake or the failure of Con-
gress to provide for its correction.
The Supreme Court has no right to reverse an initial decision ascer-
taining intent and extracting a constitutional principle and thereby
in effect to amend the Constitution. This view is shared by Americans
all over the nation-north, south, east and west-who are not influ-
enced by hatred, intolerance or politics, but influenced solely by law,
logic and a correct interpretation of constitutional principles and of
history.
WHAT IS "THE LAW OF THE LAND"?
There has, in my opinion, been a great deal of misunderstanding
and confusion about what is meant by the expression, "the law of
the land." Most of our people are conscientious and patriotic and have
a fervent desire to obey, so far as safe and practicable, what they con-
ceive to be "the law of the land."
The Constitution provides that the Supreme Law of the Land is the
Constitution, statutes passed under the provisions of the Constitution,
8 Address by E. Morton Coulter, Professor Emeritus, University of Georgia.
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and treaties entered into under the authority of the United States.
Whatever may be true about other decisions by the Supreme Court
there are two types of decisions which in inexorable effect become the
law of the land. These are: (1) decisions which for the first time
ascertain and define the intent of the framers and adopters of the Con-
stitution or its amendments, and (2) decisions which for the first time
ascertain and define the intent of Congress in passing an Act. In each
case, the Court thus defines the meaning of certain words of the Con-
stitution or Act, and the definition becomes in effect a part of the
words defined.
In the first class of cases the initial ascertainment and definition of
the intent of the framers and adopters of the Constitution or amend-
ments become an integral part of the Constitution itself and can be
altered or modified only by an amendment to the Constitution by the
method provided therein. This is true whether the decision ascertain-
ing the intent is right or wrong because to allow a majority of the
Supreme Court to change its mind at will as to the definition of the
original intent would destroy the basis and philosophy of our govern-
ment, which is limited (and written) constitutional government.
In the second class of cases the initial ascertainment of the intent of
Congress in passing an Act-the initial definition of its words-becomes
a part of the Act itself and this initial ascertainment of intent is not
subject to alteration or modification by the Supreme Court because
the Supreme Court has no authority to legislate. To permit the Su-
preme Court to continually change its mind about what Congress
intended would be in effect to permit it to legislate, contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution.
It thus becomes clear that when the two classes of initial decisions
are rendered they become a part of the law of the land and remain so
until the intention so ascertained and defined by the Court is changed
by amendment of the Constitution or, in the case of an Act of Con-
gress, by congressional revision of its Act.
When the Supreme Court itself undertakes to reverse or modify its
initial decision ascertaining and defining intent in either class of cases,
it is exceeding its power under our constitutional system. The deci-
sions of the Court acting beyond the scope of its power are, as the
Supreme Court itself has many times held, wholly and completely
void. The fact that the Court may have been endeavoring to attain
idealistic and, to its way of thinking, desirable goals cuts no figure,
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because the end does not justify unconstitutional means. If these are
desired under our form of government they must be obtained by legal
means.
It is what may in the future be done under a principle or practice
that determines the soundness-the legality and validity-of the prin-
ciple or practice, and not merely what is actually done at present. The
logical consequences must be taken into consideration. To see just
what could happen under the practice of the Supreme Court of re-
versing its initial decisions in which the intention of the framers and
adopters was ascertained, let us consider the matter of a Federal In-
come Tax. Suppose that, instead of adopting the proposed amend-
ment to the Constitution authorizing a Federal Income Tax, the
States had defeated the amendment. The very next year Congress
could have passed a statute similar to the one held to be unconstitu-
tional, prior to the proposed constitutional amendment, and the Su-
preme Court could have ruled the last statute constitutional. Does it
not make cold chills run up and down your spine to think that five
men can defy the will and hope of a whole nation? Well, that is the
kind of thing we are witnessing, whether by the Supreme Court or
other branches of government or all combined.
The law of the land as to provisions of the Constitution, the mean-
ing of which is uncertain, is in effect the initial decision of the Su-
preme Court ascertaining and defining the original intent of the
framers and adopters because it becomes in each instance in effect a
part of the defined words of the Constitution. Any other or subse-
quent decision changing or reversing the definition of that intent
amounts, in reality, to a constitutional amendment by the Supreme
Court.
It occurs to me that irrefutable proof that such an initial decision
becomes in effect a part and parcel of the Constitution is the fact that
in three instances the Constitution has been amended to put into the
Constitution provisions which the Court had held were not already in
it. In Chisholm v. Georgia,4 the Supreme Court decided that a state
could be sued in assumpsit by a citizen of another state. That meant
that the Supreme Court construed the Constitution to intend that
such an action would lie. The Constitution was immediately amended
(11 th Amendment) to provide that such an action could not be insti-
tuted. The decision of the Supreme Court was not amended. There is
4 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419 (1793).
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no such remedy provided in the Constitution. The Constitution was
construed by the Court and thereafter it meant what the Supreme
Court said it meant. Whether the Supreme Court decided the case
right is immaterial. Its decision was marged and melded into the Con-
stitution and in such event the only remedy is amendment as provided
in the Constitution and not by a reversal of decision by the Supreme
Court. If the people of America had been satisfied that the decision
was right, or were satisfied with it even if it was wrong, the only right
of amendment was with the people and not with the Court. The next
instance is the Dred Scott case. 5 Whether right or wrong, the decision
was wiped out by Amendments 13, 14, and 15. The decision was
a part of the Constitution or an amendment could not have changed it.
The third instance, already alluded to, is the amendment authorizing
the income tax. The conclusion is inescapable and unanswerable that
if a Supreme Court ruling can be corrected by a constitutional amend-
ment it cannot be corrected by the Supreme Court by a reversal of its
decision for the reason that the Constitution does not provide for a
circuitous or substitute method of amendment in such cases. If we sub-
mit to such a practice we surrender our written constitutional form of
government. Whatever may have been the status before 1954 the issue
is now drawn and you cannot dodge an honest issue. The rule laid
down in Gong Lum v. Rice 6-separate and equal facilities-is the law
of the land and those opposing the 1954' and similar subsequent deci-
sions are not misguided, ignorant, intolerant radicals after all.
LAW OF CASES
Those who contend that no court decision can be more than the
law of the case, binding only the parties to the case, overlook the dis-
tinction between common law decisions, which appellate courts are
not bound to follow, and statutory-construction decisions and Consti-
tution-construction decisions, which appellate courts are bound to fol-
low under the provisions of the Constitution. This difference will be
discussed later.
REVERSE-INTERPRETATION PRACTICE BEGAN IN 1937
For nearly 150 years prior to 1937 the Supreme Court never
asserted directly the power of that Court to overrule prior decisions
5 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
7 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of the Court construing provisions of the Constitution. The decisions
in the Genesee8 case and in the Legal Tender" cases do not support a
contrary assertion. The question of the power of the Court to over-
rule prior decisions was first brought out into the open by the dissent-
ing opinions in Morehead v. New York, ex rel. Tipaldo.'0 In that case
the Court, five to four, approved an earlier decision. The same ques-
tion arose in 1937 in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish," and the Court
by a five to four vote overruled the decision approved in the More-
head12 case. Mr. Justice Roberts switched his vote in the later case
and seemingly later regretted it. (See his dissenting opinions in Mah-
nich v. Southern Steamship Co.,'" and in Smith v. Allwright.14) Since
1937 the Court has many times overruled prior decisions of that Court
in similar cases. 15
The Constituion is a contract between the several sovereign States
and the Federal Government. That contract provides that the States
surrender certain attributes of sovereignty to the Federal Govern-
ment. The rest are reserved to the States. One provision of the con-
tract is that the contract cannot be amended except as provided in the
(contract) Constitution. The Federal Government has been violating
the contract since 1937. Up to 1954 we acquiesced in the unconstitu-
tional actions. We do not acquiesce in the 1954 decision or in any
subsequent ones. By our acquiescence in the decisions prior to 1954 we
are not estopped to call a halt now and that is just what we do. We
want the contract complied with.
14TH AMENDMENT MEANS WHAT IT MEANT IN 1868
WHEN ADOPTED
It is axiomatic that a Constitution or an amendment thereto means
what it meant at the time of adoption. That is a truth of universal
acceptance and application except on occasion by the United States
8 The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
9 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
10 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
11 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
12 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
18 321 U.S. 96, 105 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
14 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
15 This paragraph is a paraphrase of a portion of a speech made by the Hon.
Dozier A. DeVane, U.S. District Judge, retired, Northern District of Florida, before
the Jacksonville Bar Association on Feb. 5, 1959.
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Supreme Court. Incredible as it seems, this is what the Supreme Court
said in the Bro'wn case: "In approaching this problem, we cannot
turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written." 6 What can this
mean if it does not mean that the Court was construing the 14th
Amendment as if it had been adopted in 1954 rather than construing
it as it should have been construed, to-wit, as of 1868, in accordance
with the ascertainment already made by the Court in 1896 and 1927?
In Smith v. Allwright,17 the Supreme Court stated:
In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continu-
ity of decision in constitutional questions. However, when convinced of former
error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitu-
tional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon leg-
islative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its powers
to re-examine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been ac-
cepted practice, and this practice has continued to this day. This is particularly
true when the decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional
principle rather than an interpretation of the Constitution to extract the prin-
ciple itself.18
In this statement the Court said that it did not attempt to correct a
mistake it made in interpreting an Act of Congress. That statement
shows a correct decision but the chances are that it was made because
Congress could act quickly in correcting the Court's mistake and not
because the Court recognized the prohibition against the Court's
power to legislate. The statement that the Court throughout its his-
tory freely exercised its power to re-examine the basis of its constitu-
tional decisions shows that the Court had not done its homework in
noting that the Court had not in the preceding 150 years intentionally
reversed an initial Constitution-interpretation decision. And, if the
truth were known, I dare say that the Court's reversal of initial de-
cisions is based on the slowness of the process of constitutional amend-
ment. The above statement states two practices of the Court, one of
them right for the wrong reason and the other wrong for every con-
ceivable reason.
THE 1954 DECISION WAS NOT ONLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
IT WAS WRONG OTHERWISE
I do not think that anyone ever seriously contended that the 14th
Amendment gave women the right to vote. It includes language
16 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
17 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 18 Id. at 665 (1944).
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broad enough to do so but the language did not mean in 1868 that
they should vote. So the women did not have the right and we amend-
ed the Constitution and gave it to them. The present Court no doubt
would give it to them if it had the chance, by saying that the 14th
Amendment does not mean what it meant in 1868 but rather it means
what the Court says it means now. It is inconceivable how, from all
the facts of life and history, the Court held that the 14th Amendment
was inconclusive as to different races attending the same school. The
state court decisions cited in Gong Lum v. Rice19 and Plessy v. Fer-
guson'0 and numerous other well-known facts show that it was much
clearer that the 14th Amendment did not intend that races could go to
the same schools than that women could not vote. Moreover, the very
same Congress which submitted the 14th Amendment enacted legis-
lation providing for a more equal distribution of funds for separate
schools in Washington and Georgetown and granting certain losses in
Washington for separate schools for Negroes. These statutes were
amended a number of times subsequently, and all the provisions relat-
ing to separate schools were carried over in a codification of the Dis-
trict laws. And, up to the time of the Segregation Cases,2' the District
schools were still segregated, and in the interim, Congress had fre-
quently passed legislation recognizing the segregated pattern of the
District School System. If the decisions since 1937 mean that the fur-
ther we get from the adoption of the Constitution and Amendments
the further we get from the principles of constitutional government
taught us by our forefathers, it is indeed much later and further than
we think. It about means the end of written constitutional govern-
ment as we have always known it. And I might suggest that if the
members of our Supreme Court still think we operate under a written
constitution it may be well for them to authoritatively inform the law
schools of the country of the fact so that the schools may desist from
their current instruction and opinion that written constitutional gov-
ernment in America is a thing of the past.
CONTRACT CONSTRUED BY COURT
The Constitution says nothing about the authority of the Supreme
Court to construe the Constitution. The case of Marbury v. Madison22
19 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 20 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
22 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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held that it had such authority. Whether right or wrong, the people
have not amended the Constitution to change the ruling. They evi-
dently agree that it is a good ruling. Can you conceive of what answer
the proponents of the 1954 decision would give to the contention that
the Supreme Court has authority after all these years to reverse Mar-
bury v. Madison? You talk about human explosions! You would have
a rash of them from coast to coast. Well, if the Court cannot reverse
Marbury v. Madison23 it cannot reverse Gong Lur v. Rice.24 Of
course the answer will come that the Court would never reverse
Marbury v. Madison,25 but that dodges the issue as those who support
the 1954 decision for political or reasons of spite dodge the real, sub-
stantial, fundamental, logical issue we in the South have tried to
present.
PEOPLE HAVE ONLY ONE CHANCE TO GET A CONSTITUTION OR AN
AMENDMENT RIGHT WITHOUT AN AMENDMENT, AND
THAT IS WHEN IT IS ADOPTED
If the people fail to include in a constitution or an amendment a
matter they intend to include, their only recourse is amendment. If an
expression used is ambiguous they have but two remedies: (1) they
can amend the Constitution or (2) ask the Supreme Court for an in-
terpretation. If the Supreme Court gives a satisfactory interpretation
the people are satisfied; if not, amendment is the only answer. The
idea that the Supreme Court is privileged to have two tries, or more
than two, at correctly ascertaining the intent of the farmers and
adopters is inconsistent with and repugnant to the principles of writ-
ten constitutional government for the reason that the provision in the
Constitution for amendment can be sidetracked by court action and
the peoples' right to amendment nullified. An initial decision by the
Court to clear up an ambiguity or ascertain doubtful intention is not
an amendment-it is an interpretation, which the Court has jurisdic-
tion to make, under the authority of Marbury v. Madison.2 6 If the
Court in 1927 in Gong Lum v. Rice27 had decided in favor of the
integration of the schools such a decision might have been wrong but
it would have been within the power of the Court and the decision
could not be attacked as a usurpation of power. It would have been
23 Ibid.
24 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 26 Ibid.
25 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 27 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
binding on us all until amended as provided in the Constitution. But
a second and reverse interpretation is equivalent to amendment which
the Court does not have jurisdiction to make. This is the answer to the
question so often asked by careless-thinking people: "If the Court can
make one interpretation why can it not make the second?" To honest
men and women of intelligence and integrity the answer is more than
sufficient. The people made the mode of amendment cumbersome to
protect the Constitution and themselves from hasty and hysterical
amendments by the states and surely they never intended to subject
the Constitution to hasty or hysterical amendment by the Court under
pressure of "souped-up" or irresponsible transient public opinion.
STARE DECISIS AS TO COMMON LAW DECISIONS HAS EXCEPTIONS;
THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IN
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL-CONSTRUCTION DECISIONS
The question is often asked: "The courts can change or reverse
common law decisions; why can they not reverse any decision?" The
answer is simple and lies in the Constitution. The rule of stare decisis
means "let the decision stand" for the sake of certainty and uniform-
ity. But judges make common law decisions. They are not based on
statutes or constitutions. They are based on the customs of peoples
crystallized by judicial decisions. If conditions change and no great
harm will result, judges often change common law decisions to fit new
circumstances and conditions-but when it comes to changing statu-
tory-interpretation decisions or constitution-interpretation decisions
the courts are limited in their power to change the initial decision.
The reason they cannot change the initial decision is that in statutory
decisions the legislative branch is clothed with the power of amend-
ment and change, after the initial interpretation, and not the court.
After the initial interpretation decision on a constitutional question the
right lies with the people to amend or not. One simple illustration will
cinch the argument. Suppose the Supreme Court initially interprets an
ambiguous Congressional Act. Congress reads the decision and deter-
mines that the Court has correctly interpreted its enactment and it
decides to let the Act stand as interpreted. If the Court later changes
and reverses itself it has gone into the field of legislation by enacting
a law when the branch of government charged with the duty of
legislating has refused to do so. The same principle applies to the
constitution-construction situation except that in reversing this type
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of initial decision the Court makes a greater error because it is less evil
for the Court to assume a legislative function than it is to assume the
power to amend the Constitution. This is the most grievous error the
Court is capable of committing.
It is said that the common law is susceptible of growth and adaptation to new
circumstances and situations, and that the courts have power to declare and
effectuate what is the present rule in respect of a given subject without regard
to the old rule; and some attempt is made to apply that principle here. The
common law is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own principles adapts
itself to varying conditions. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. [371 (1933)]. But
here, we are dealing with a constitutional provision which has in effect adopted
the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules existed
in 1791. To effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the common
law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution. The distinction is funda-
mental, and has been clearly pointed out by Judge Cooley in 1 Const. Limita-
tions, 8th ed., 124.28
EACH STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ITS SCHOOLS
On the question of the rights of the states to control their schools
it is interesting to note that in the acts admitting about ten of the
thirteen or fourteen states since the 14th Amendment there has been
a specific provision that these states could control their schools. It is
submitted that the reason for this provision (and it should have been
in all of the admitting acts) is that Congress knew that the states
admitted before the 14th Amendment already had complete control
of their schools under the 9th and 10th Amendments and knew that
all states had to be admitted on exactly the same basis. But even if this
is not true-and it is certainly not conceded not to be true-all states
must be admitted on the same basis and, since there is no way to
remove the rights of these ten states over their schools without their
consent, all of the other states automatically have the same rights.
The Supreme Court has presented a predicament. In honor, charac-
ter and integrity it ought to reverse the 1954 and similar integration
decisions. If it does not, Congress should act and relieve the situation.
We have a solemn contract and the government has repudiated it.
We, as sovereign states, ought to be given better treatment than a
Communist dictator. Integrity and good faith begin at home. We
joined the Union in good faith and our sacred contract should be
observed until it is changed according to agreement. Military tactics
through the use of troops should not be resorted to in order to enforce
28 Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935).
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submission to a lawless decree against a sovereign state, helpless to
defend itself against the power of the Nation whose duty it is to
protect it. There is no hope for any sovereign state except the con-
science of America. If that conscience could be shown the naked
truth, with all political and emotional considerations removed, a way
could be found to peacefully and in good will solve the racial prob-
lems confronting us. If America could only understand the law and
the facts the answer in this case would be clear. Force is not the
answer.
The only check on the Supreme Court's usurpation of power is
the force of public opinion. The integrity, character and conscience
of the American people are on trial. Before God, what is your answer?
In Washington's Farewell Address he admonished all Americans
as follows:
If in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the Consti-
tutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an Amend-
ment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change
by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good,
it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The
precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or
transient benefit which the use itself can at any time yield....
The most discouraging fact connected with the present controversy
is that outstanding citizens are sometimes deluded by the specious
argument that to criticize a court for exercising authority which it
does not possess has the effect of undermining law and order.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Few of those who really
understand what I'm talking about would have the audacity to say
that the people of a nation must stand dumb in the face of usurpation
of power by their highest court. It will be a tragedy if the people of
the United States fail for any reason to distinguish between the
judgments of courts rendered within their constitutional jurisdiction
and those which are rendered beyond their constitutional jurisdiction
and contrary to the authority which gave them life.
No decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is entitled
any greater moral weight than its context merits. If a decision of the
Supreme Court is correct and in accord with the fundamental law of
the Constitution, it carries great moral force and should be respected
and followed. If, on the other hand, it undertakes to announce a rule
contrary to our Federal Constitution, contrary to the dual system
which is the very foundation of our national government, and clearly
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indicates that the law and the facts have been ignored, such decision
violates the law itself and is entitled to no respect and should be sternly
disapproved and condemned by both officials and the general public.
Such a decision is not "the law," but is simply an enforceable pro-
nouncement of the Court.
The late Mr. Justice Cardozo, one of the greatest legal luminaries
ever to grace the Supreme Court bench, in his book, The Nature of
the Judicial Process, wrote:
Judges have, of course, the power, though not the right, to ignore the mandate
of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it. They have the power, though
not the right, to travel beyond the walls of the interstices, the bounds set to
judicial innovation by precedent and custom. None the less, by that abuse of
power, they violate the law.29
The Supreme Court violated the law of legal precedent by ignoring
and refusing to follow its own prior decisions which hold that sep-
arate but equal school facilities met Constitutional requirements un-
der the 14th Amendment; it violated the law by its usurpation and
exercise of power and authority that was never intended that it should
have or exercise by the framers and adopters of the Constitution of
the United States.
A usurper is a tyrant, in whatever garb he is clothed. If we cannot
lift our voices against them we have surrendered our freedom. God
help us not to make that mistake.
29 CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921).
